An examination of previous claims for virtually perfect time-sharing in dual-task situations reveals confounding effects that may have obscured dual-task interference. Two experiments are conducted in which these confounding effects are minimized, revealing statistically significant dual-task interference. These results support the hypothesis that human information processing is dominated by a structural central capacity limitation and call into question the hypothesis that dual-task interference can be eliminated by meeting the 5 conditions outlined by D. Meyer and D. Kieras (1999).
In the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (Telford, 1931) , subjects are presented with two stimuli in rapid succession, to which they are required to make speeded responses. The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; the time between the onset of the first and second stimulus) is varied, and reaction time (RT) and accuracy for both tasks are measured. It is generally observed that RTs to Task 2 increase by several hundred milliseconds as the SOA is decreased, whereas performance on Task 1 is often affected to a much smaller degree, and sometimes not at all (Carrier & Pashler, 1995; DeJong, 1993 DeJong, , 1995 Logan & Delheimer, 2001; Logan & Schulkind, 2000; McCann & Johnston, 1992; Pashler & Johnston, 1989; Telford, 1931; , 2003 Welford, 1952) . This increase in Task 2 RTs with decreasing SOA is known as the PRP effect, and it is believed by many researchers to indicate a fundamental limitation in human performance (see Pashler, 1994 , for a review).
It is important to understand the nature of this fundamental limitation. Most researchers believe that it results from a central bottleneck in information processing (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a , 1997b Pashler, 1994) or a capacity-limited central process that can allocate resources in a graded fashion to both Task 1 and Task 2 simultaneously (Navon & Miller, 2002; , 2003 . In this respect the bottleneck versus capacity-sharing debate boils down to whether capacity-limited central stages of processing must process information serially (bottleneck models) or in parallel but at a limited rate (capacity-sharing models). Although this remains an important issue, it is not addressed in the present article. Also of importance regarding the nature of this fundamental limitation in information processing is whether it represents a structural limitation (Pashler, 1994) or a strategic one (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a , 1997b Schumacher et al., 2001) . If the PRP effect is due to strategic factors, then it may in fact not reflect a fundamental limitation in information processing. Furthermore, it opens the possibility that the apparent limitations in the flow of information processing might be bypassed, assuming an appropriate shift in processing strategy. The present article addresses this issue.
A Structural Fundamental Limitation in Information Processing
According to the structural view, the central capacity limitation in information processing (whether it is an all-or-none bottleneck or a graded capacity-sharing limited resource stage of processing) results from the need to process both information-processing streams through a common, limited-capacity mechanism. The limitation is structural in the sense that it is caused by a property of a fundamental processing mechanism. As such, it cannot be alleviated by acting directly on the bottleneck stage. On the other hand, there may be several ways in which various forms of practice could allow vast improvements in performance, despite the presence of bottleneck stages. Practice may allow some processes that require central resources early in practice to be automatized, thus relieving the central capacity limitation of the burden of this processing. In addition, practice may make central processing more efficient, thus reducing the amount of central resources required by a process. In this manner the duration of central processing may be reduced. For example, Van Selst, Ruthruff, and Johnston (1999) demonstrated for all but one of their subjects that even after extensive dual-task practice, dual-task interference, although greatly reduced, persists. The one subject in the Van Selst et al. study that did not show any dual-task interference showed evidence of a latent bottleneck in follow-up experiments (Ruthruff, Johnston, Van Selst, Whitsell, & Remington, 2003) . By a latent bottleneck we mean that central processing for the two tasks still relies on a limited pool of capacity but that central stages in the two tasks failed to overlap in time. Dual-task interference would have been observed had central processing for the two tasks overlapped, but because of the timing of the two tasks, they fail to do so. By varying the SOA between two tasks, or by lengthening the duration of central (or precentral) processing in the faster task, a latent bottleneck can be revealed (i.e., dual-task interference is observed). Ruthruff, Pashler, and Klaassen (2001) have also provided evidence that suggests a structural bottleneck. The work of Ruthruff and colleagues suggests that practice reduces the duration of central processing but does not eliminate it. Central processing requirements of a task can be greatly reduced via the chunking of inputs and outputs (Jolicoeur, Tombu, Oriet, & Stevanovski, 2002) and the use of well-learned stimulus-response mappings (Greenwald, 2003; Greenwald & Schulman, 1973; Schumacher et al., 2001; Van Selst et al., 1999) . These factors may result in the elimination of observed dual-task interference, but care must be taken to ensure that the elimination of dual-task interference has not occurred because the capacity limitation has become latent. In fact, the results of Ruthruff et al. (2003) suggest this is exactly what occurred for the one subject in Van Selst et al. (1999) that failed to show dual-task interference. This result (Ruthruff et al., 2003) stresses the importance of taking care to explore the possibility of a latent capacity limitation before drawing the conclusion that dual-task interference has been eliminated.
A Strategic Fundamental Limitation in Information Processing
According to a strategic view, the central capacity limitation in information processing (in the form of a bottleneck) is invoked by the system for one of many possible reasons (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a , 1997b . Under appropriate circumstances, this strategic bottleneck does not need to be invoked, and all stages of multiple tasks can be carried out in parallel. When this occurs, virtually perfect time-sharing should be observed. That is, it should take no more time to perform a task in a dual-task setting than it does in isolation.
The conditions under which virtually perfect time-sharing is predicted have been outlined by Meyer and Kieras (1999) ; they claim that such virtually perfect time-sharing occurs when five prerequisite conditions prevail in combination: (1) participants are encouraged to give the tasks equal priority; (2) participants are expected to perform each task quickly; (3) there are no constraints on temporal relations or serial order among responses; (4) different tasks use different perceptual and motor processors; and (5) participants receive enough practice to compile complete production rule sets for performing each task. (p. 54) Attempts to Demonstrate Virtually Perfect Time-Sharing Schumacher et al. (2001) recently reported results they claim demonstrate virtually perfect time-sharing. In their Experiment 1, subjects performed five sessions of trials. In each session they performed trials that consisted of one or both of two tasks. One of the tasks was to indicate verbally which one of three possible tone pitches was presented. The other task required subjects to indicate manually in which of three horizontally located positions a capital O appeared (i.e., OϪϪ, ϪOϪ, or ϪϪO). There were two types of trial blocks within each session. In a pure-trial block, subjects performed 45 single-task trials of the same type (either the visualmanual task or the auditory-vocal task). These trials are referred to as homogeneous single-task trials. In the mixed-trial blocks, subjects performed 18 dual-task trials in which both the visualmanual and auditory-vocal tasks were performed, as well as 15 of each of the single-task trial types (visual-manual, auditory-vocal) . Single-task trials in mixed blocks were referred to as heterogeneous single-task trials. On dual-task trials the auditory and visual stimuli were presented simultaneously. Subjects were free to respond to the stimuli in any order, and they were instructed to give the tasks equal priority. In mixed-trial blocks, dual-and single-task trials were randomly intermixed.
Deadlines were used to encourage subjects to process the stimuli as quickly as possible. Deadlines for each task (the visual-manual and auditory-vocal tasks) were established by taking the value at the 75th percentile from the RT distribution of prior heterogeneous single-task trials. This value was then used as the response deadline for that task for all trial types (homogeneous single-task, heterogeneous single-task, and dual-task trials). The purpose of using a deadline generated from (heterogeneous) single-task performance for the dual-task deadline was to put strong pressure on subjects to bring dual-task performance to the level of single-task performance. We discuss potential problems with this choice of deadlines in the Mobilized Effort section below. Schumacher et al. (2001) argued that if information processing is dominated by a structural capacity limitation, then performance on the dual-task trials should be worse than performance on either the homogeneous or heterogeneous single-task trials. This is because the task performed second in dual-task trials should be interfered with in the same way that the second task in the PRP paradigm is affected. However, if virtually perfect time-sharing is possible, then after sufficient practice, dual-task performance should be equivalent to homogeneous or heterogeneous single-task performance because the five conditions outlined by Meyer and Kieras (1999) would have been met. By the fifth session (approximately 3,400 trials) in Experiment 1 of Schumacher et al., performance in homogeneous single-task trials, heterogeneous singletask trials, and dual-task trials were statistically equivalent. This result was interpreted by Schumacher et al. as a demonstration of virtually perfect time-sharing.
Although the design used by Schumacher et al. (2001) and the results they reported appear to support their claims for virtually perfect time-sharing, we argue below that there are several methodological flaws in the Schumacher et al. design that may have masked dual-task interference. We describe these flaws in the sections that follow. The experiments we report in this article reexamined whether well-practiced observers exhibit perfect timesharing using experimental designs that avoid the technical problems in the Schumacher et al. design.
Mobilized Effort
The deadlines used in Schumacher et al.'s (2001) Experiment 1 were the same within a task for all trial types (homogeneous single, heterogeneous single, and dual task). Deadlines (for each task) were taken from the RT distribution of prior heterogeneous singletask trials. Schumacher et al. used this deadline procedure to encourage observers to respond quickly in dual-task trials. Recall that heterogeneous single-task trials were the single-task trials that were intermixed with dual-task trials. Homogeneous single-task trials were the single-task trials from "pure blocks," in which the same task was performed on all trials. Given that on pure blocks subjects knew the task that was to be performed before the trial began, it seems reasonable to assume that, all else being equal, subjects should be able to perform faster on these trials than on heterogeneous single-task trials, where trial type was less certain.
We revisit this assumption in the Trial Type Uncertainty and Omission of an Expected Stimulus section below.
If we assume for the moment that subjects are in fact able to perform homogeneous single-task trials faster than heterogeneous single-task trials, it would be comparatively easy to beat the heterogeneous single-task deadline on a homogeneous single-task trial. This would allow subjects to put less effort (and therefore perform less efficiently) into homogeneous single-task trials and still be able to beat the deadline. However, efficient performance would be encouraged on heterogeneous single-task trials by the use of an appropriate deadline (previous heterogeneous trials). On dual-task trials subjects would be pushed even harder to beat the deadline. Assuming that subjects can dynamically change mobilized effort from trial to trial, or even between blocks, the claimed observation of virtually perfect time-sharing in the Schumacher et al. (2001) study may have been artifactually produced by the use of an overly liberal deadline in homogeneous (pure) single-task trials and an overly hard deadline on dual-task trials.
There is evidence that subjects can increase performance levels (e.g., decrease RT with no corresponding decrease in accuracy) on a trial-to-trial basis (Kleinsorge, 2001) . Kleinsorge (2001, Experiment 1) had subjects perform blocks of 120 letter classification trials. On each trial a white star at fixation became increasingly larger and was eventually replaced by one of four letters. Subjects made a response to the identity of the letter as quickly and accurately as possible. After the fifth block, subjects were told that on some trials (effort trials) the star would turn green as it increased in size. On these effort trials subjects were instructed to respond especially fast without reducing their accuracy. They were also instructed to remain fast and accurate on standard trials. Performance on the fifth block (the block before the introduction of effort trials) was used as a gauge to ascertain whether subjects remained fast on standard trials. If standard trial performance on the current block (after Block 5) was faster than performance on the block used to gauge whether subjects remained fast on standard trials, this value became the new gauge. Subjects performed 10 more blocks of 120 experimental trials per block, in which 20% of trials were effort trials. Kleinsorge found that subjects were able to increase performance (i.e., reduce RT without increasing error rate) on effort trials. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1. Differences between standard and effort trials were moderately large, in the 30 -50-ms range, given that the task took only 450 ms to perform.
If we continue to assume for the moment that, all else being equal, subjects in the Schumacher et al. (2001) experiment could perform faster on homogeneous single-task trials than on dual-task trials or heterogeneous single-task trials, less effort would be required on homogeneous single-task trials to beat the deadline established from the distribution of heterogeneous RTs. Likewise, if dual-task trials actually are slower than heterogeneous singletask trials (all else being equal) more effort would be required on dual-task trials to beat the deadline established from the distribution of heterogeneous RTs. As a result, trial type could have been confounded with mobilized effort, and differences in mobilized effort may have masked real dual-task interference.
In the experiments reported in this article, we used a deadline procedure that alleviated this potential confound by calculating the deadline for a particular block from the most recent block of that type. By doing so, we hoped to encourage subjects to perform with equal efficiency (equal amounts of effort) by making it equally difficult in each trial type to beat the deadline. If our earlier assumption that, all else being equal, homogeneous single-task performance is faster than dual-task performance is correct, this change should remove differences in mobilized effort and reveal dual-task interference.
Appropriate Baseline Schumacher et al. (2001) argued that virtually perfect timesharing could be demonstrated by comparing dual-task performance to both heterogeneous and homogeneous single-task performance. When testing for dual-task interference, Schumacher et al. compared dual-task performance to homogeneous single-task performance. Given that on homogeneous single-task trials subjects knew the trial type before each trial, the use of this condition as a baseline for assessing dual-task interference seems an especially stringent choice of baselines. The fact that no dual-task interference was observed despite this stringent baseline appears on the surface to be an especially convincing demonstration of virtually perfect time-sharing. However, as previously argued, the choice of deadline used by Schumacher et al. confounds trial type with mobilized effort, and this may have masked real dual-task interference. As well, other differences appear to exist between conditions in the Schumacher et al. study. In order to assess dual-task interference, it is important to equate different conditions as much as possible so that any differences that are observed can be properly attributed to dual-task interference and not some other factor. In the paragraphs that follow, we discuss several factors that can affect performance in these conditions and can hinder their usefulness as baselines.
In Schumacher et al.'s (2001) dual-task blocks, single-task trials were intermixed among the dual-task trials. As a result, trial type was unknown from trial to trial, resulting in task uncertainty. On some trials, only one task was performed (this can be viewed as a dual-task trial with one task omitted), and trial type sometimes changed from one trial to the next. Earlier we assumed that these differences should have resulted in homogeneous single-task trials being faster than heterogeneous single-task performance. We now present evidence supporting this assumption. Specifically, we address how trial type uncertainty, omission of an expected stimulus, and task switching could each affect performance.
Trial Type Uncertainty and Omission of an Expected Stimulus
Given that there were three trial types in dual-task blocks (single-task auditory-vocal task, single-task visual-manual task, and dual-task trials), it is unlikely that subjects would be as prepared for each task in the dual-task blocks as compared with homogeneous single-task blocks where subjects knew which task would be performed. DeJong (1995) demonstrated that when subjects are unprepared for a task, performance suffers. In Experiment 1, DeJong had subjects perform blocks of intermixed dual-and single-task trials. Presentation order and SOA (100-and 350-ms SOAs) were varied on dual-task trials. On each trial a cue was presented that could validly, invalidly, or neutrally cue the subject to the presentation order (or to the trial type on single-task trials). When the cue carried information (i.e., when it was not neutral) it was valid 80% of the time. This allowed DeJong to vary preparedness. On validly cued trials, subjects could prepare (to the extent possible) for the upcoming task (or task order) before the arrival of the stimulus (as could be done in homogeneous single-task blocks in the Schumacher et al., 2001, study) . On invalidly cued trials, subjects would prepare for the wrong task (which could happen on heterogeneous single-and dual-task trials in the Schumacher et al. study), meaning that no benefit (and possibly a cost) from preparation would be expected. On neutrally cued trials, one might expect that subjects would sometimes be prepared for the correct task and sometimes be prepared for the wrong task (or not prepare at all). If preparation affects performance, for single-task performance, subjects should be fastest on validly cued trials, followed by neutrally cued trials, and slowest on invalidly cued trials. Results confirmed these predictions. In addition, on dual-task trials, subjects often processed invalidly cued trials in the expected order rather than in the presentation order, as indicated by a greater proportion of response reversals on invalidly cued trials. These results suggest that subjects tended to prepare for one task (or task order) at a time and that preparedness facilitated performance when subjects knew what to expect but hurt performance when they prepared for the wrong task (or task order). Had subjects been able to be prepared for both tasks (and task orders) simultaneously, an unexpected stimulus (or stimulus order) should not have harmed performance. In a follow-up experiment, DeJong (1995, Experiment 3) found evidence that on dual-task trials, subjects prepare for the task order, not just the first task. This indicates that subjects were also prepared to perform the second task, although it is unknown whether the second task was as prepared as the first.
In dual-task blocks in the Schumacher et al. (2001) study, subjects had to be prepared for three different trial types: the auditory-vocal task by itself, the visual-manual task by itself, or dual-task trials. The results of DeJong (1995) suggest strongly that subjects cannot be as prepared for all three trial types as they can be for just one. In addition, on heterogeneous single-task trials, subjects will also be (partially) prepared for a trial type that did not occur (some of the time). The failure of an expected stimulus (and task) to occur may have thrown off or surprised subjects, causing them to perform more poorly. Supporting this contention, Gottsdanker (1979) showed that when a dual-task trial is expected, the omission of an expected stimulus (either Stimulus 1 or Stimulus 2) slowed performance on the remaining task. Although omissions were far less frequent in the Gottsdanker study than in mixed blocks in the Schumacher et al. study, the omission of an expected task on heterogeneous single-task trials may nonetheless have slowed performance relative to homogeneous single-task trials. Taken together, subjects may have opted to not commit (or not commit as strongly) to any particular type of trial before stimulus presentation to avoid the cost of being prepared for a trial type that failed to occur. To the extent that the results of the DeJong (1995) and Gottsdanker (1979) studies generalize to the Schumacher et al. (2001) experiments, on the basis of preparedness alone, one would expect homogeneous single-task performance to be faster than heterogeneous single-or dual-task trials. The fact that no difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous single-task performance was observed in the Schumacher et al. study should not be taken as evidence that the results of DeJong and Gottsdanker do not generalize to more practiced subjects. As previously noted, the deadline used by Schumacher et al. introduced a confound between trial type and mobilized effort that could have masked any real difference between single-task conditions (see the Mobilized Effort section above). To determine whether these results generalized to more practiced subjects, controls must be put into place that eliminate this confound. Efforts are made in the present experiments to do so.
Task Switching
Trials in which subjects switch tasks from the previous trial have been shown to be slower than trials in which the same task is performed on consecutive trials (Rogers & Monsell, 1995) . This result suggests that when subjects must switch tasks from trial to trial, as in the Schumacher et al. (2001) study, as well as in the present study, a performance decrement should be expected. Specifically, in the mixed dual-and single-task blocks in the Schumacher et al. study, subjects were required to switch tasks between single-task auditory-vocal trials, single-task visual-manual trials, and dual-task trials. Therefore, one would expect to find taskswitching costs for both heterogeneous single-and dual-task trials.
Using Homogeneous Single-Task Performance as a Baseline for Assessing Dual-Task Interference
None of the considerations just discussed (reduced preparedness, omission of an expected stimulus, or task switching) apply to homogeneous single-task trials. In homogeneous single-task blocks, subjects knew the trial type before the trial began and therefore could be optimally prepared for the task. As well, task omissions never occurred. Because the same task was always performed, no task-switching costs would be expected. Given the ability to be fully prepared, the lack of task omissions, and the lack of task-switching costs, one might have expected that performance on homogeneous single-task trials would have been faster than performance on dual-task trials (and heterogeneous single-task trials) even if virtually perfect time-sharing was a possibility. This was not observed in the Schumacher et al. (2001) study. There are two possible reasons why this may have been the case. The first possibility is that increased preparation, removal of occasional task omissions, and removing task-switching costs do not speed up processing in pure single-task blocks. This seems unlikely given the evidence reviewed above suggesting that these factors do influence processing speed (at least with low levels of practice). The second possibility is that some other counteracting effect(s) canceled out the benefit derived from these effects.
One possible counteracting effect is differential levels of effort in different blocks. As previously argued (see the Mobilized Effort section above) if subjects find single-task blocks easier, it may be that they invest less effort and this slows performance. Given that the deadlines for the homogeneous single-task trials were calculated from heterogeneous single-task RT distributions, deadlines could still be beaten even if less effort was invested. If, all else being equal, homogeneous single-task performance is faster than heterogeneous single-task performance (because of the factors discussed above or other factors), when a more appropriate deadline is used, subjects should be able to perform better on homogeneous single-task trials than on heterogeneous single-task trials. Finding such a performance advantage would call into question the validity of the homogeneous single-task baseline condition as used by Schumacher et al. (2001) because it would reveal that subjects were not performing at optimal levels in this condition.
In fact, Hazeltine, Teague, and Ivry (2002) conducted a series of experiments very similar to those conducted by Schumacher et al. (2001) that shed some light on this point. An important difference between these two studies is that in the Hazeltine et al. study, the deadline for homogeneous single-task performance was determined from previous homogeneous single-task trials instead of from heterogeneous single-task trials. Deadlines for heterogeneous single-and dual-task trials were calculated from previous heterogeneous single-task performance. By implementing this change to the deadline used on homogeneous single-task trials, differences in mobilized effort between the single-task conditions were likely reduced, although differences probably persisted given that the heterogeneous single-task trials were still interleaved with the dual-task trials that continued to have an especially difficult deadline. Although this is not the ideal situation in which to examine differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous single-task performance, it may nonetheless be sufficient to demonstrate that, all else being equal, homogeneous single-task performance is superior to heterogeneous single-task performance. In the present experiments a closer examination of the differences between these two conditions is performed. Hazeltine et al. (2002) conducted four experiments, and successive experiments included only subjects from preceding experiments. As a result, subjects in subsequent experiments were increasingly more practiced. If subjects were more prepared on homogeneous single-task trials than on heterogeneous single-task trials, differences between these conditions for one or both tasks should be observed. This follows from the fact that the deadlines for these two conditions encouraged equally efficient processing. Differences may not be observed for both tasks because subjects may adopt a strategy on mixed blocks by which they prepare for one task (probably the faster task, as it would be the one that would be processed first on dual-task trials). As a result, preparation levels would be similar across single-task conditions. This is essentially what was observed.
For the visual-manual task, differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous single-task performance were essentially nil, except in Experiment 2, where heterogeneous single-task performance was actually slightly (less than 10 ms) faster than homogeneous single-task performance. This suggests that subjects prepared to perform the faster visual-manual task first on mixed blocks. From a structural bottleneck framework, this strategy seems efficient given that on dual-task trials this would be the first task processed by the bottleneck. As a result, on 33 of 48 trials per mixed block, this strategy would lead to the subject being prepared for the right task.
If subjects are in fact prepared for the visual-manual task on mixed blocks, differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous single-task performance should be observed for the auditory-vocal task. This is what was observed. In all four experiments, subjects were faster on homogeneous single-task trials than on heterogeneous single-task trials, and this difference was statistically significant for all experiments except Experiment 1, in which subjects were least practiced.
By partially correcting the deadline problem found in Schumacher et al. (2001), Hazeltine et al. (2002) have shown that there appears to be an advantage for homogeneous single-task trials over heterogeneous single-task trials (see also Greenwald, 2003, Experiment 2) . However, there remain other differences between these two conditions that were not equated in the Hazeltine et al. study. In the present experiments, we aimed to equate homogeneous and heterogeneous single-task trials more fully to show the full extent of the differences between these conditions. Nonetheless, the results of Hazeltine et al. provide empirical support for our arguments concerning the inadequacies of the deadlines and baselines used by Schumacher et al.
Using Heterogeneous Single-Task Performance as a Baseline for Assessing Dual-Task Interference
In the Hazeltine et al. (2002) study, performance in the dual-task condition was at the same level as heterogeneous single-task performance. On the basis of this pattern of results, despite the significant difference between both of these conditions and the homogeneous single-task condition, Hazeltine et al. concluded that virtually perfect time-sharing had been achieved. In the paragraph that follows, we challenge the appropriateness of using heterogeneous single-task performance as a baseline for assessing dual-task interference.
The argument for intermixing single-task trials with dual-task trials is usually based on the notion that doing so equates singleand dual-task trials for a certain type of preparedness or task-set load. The argument is that on dual-task trials, one must maintain two sets of task rules and stimulus-response mappings, and so one must be prepared to perform both tasks. Intuitively, intermixing the two types of single-task trials that are the constituents of dual-task trials appears to equate the total mental load and need to remain prepared for two different task sets. Thus, proponents for the use of heterogeneous single-task baselines argue that this type of baseline equates for the need to be prepared for two tasks. However, there are several other possible influences on performance in mixed blocks in Schumacher et al.'s (2001) Experiment 1, and it is unclear exactly how subjects actually respond to these multiple influences. For example, the absence of an expected stimulus can disrupt processing (Gottsdanker, 1979) , which means that preparing for both tasks on every trial could impair heterogeneous single-task performance. However, not preparing for a stimulus that does occur can also hamper performance (DeJong, 1995) . In the Schumacher et al. study, each task was present on over two thirds of the trials (33/48), and dual-task trials were the most frequent trial type (18/48), so preparing for both tasks may have been the best strategy. However, it remains unclear exactly what preparatory strategy subjects actually used.
In fact, individual differences in dual-task interference levels reported in the Schumacher et al. (2001, Experiment 3 ) study may reflect different preparatory strategies used. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 1 except that the visual-manual task was more difficult. Specifically, a capital O could appear at one of four locations (e.g., ---O), and subjects made an incompatibly mapped manual response to its location. Dual-task interference levels varied dramatically from subject to subject, with some subjects showing minimal dual-task interference while others showed large amounts of dual-task interference. Schumacher et al. argued that this difference reflected different approaches to the tasks. It was hypothesized that those subjects who had shown minimal dual-task interference had used a daring scheduling ap-proach on dual-task trials and had therefore been able to achieve virtually perfect time-sharing, whereas those who had shown large amounts of dual-task interference had used a cautious strategy and had performed elements of the tasks serially. Schumacher et al. argued that this pattern of results again demonstrated the human capacity for virtually perfect time-sharing. However, the criticisms leveled against Experiment 1 of the Schumacher et al. study also apply to Experiment 3. As in Experiment 1, confounds exist between conditions in Experiment 3, which calls into question the conclusion that virtually perfect time-sharing had been achieved.
An alternative explanation for the variability in dual-task interference observed from subject to subject in Experiment 3 of the Schumacher et al. (2001) study is that subjects who fully prepared for dual-task trials on the mixed blocks suffered a preparedness cost on the heterogeneous single-task trials but not on the dual-task trials, which had the effect of reducing dual-task interference. Conversely, subjects who opted to not prepare for any particular trial type beforehand (or who prepared for a single-task trial) on mixed blocks suffered preparedness costs for both single-and dual-task trials, which had the effect of increasing dual-task interference.
Given the uncertainty associated with the mixed blocks as used by Schumacher et al. (2001) and Hazeltine et al. (2002) , it is unclear exactly what differences exist between dual-and heterogeneous single-task conditions. As a result, the use of heterogeneous single-task trials as a baseline from which to measure dual-task interference may not be appropriate. Below we revisit the appropriate baseline argument (see the Appropriate Baselines Revisited section) and conclude that different block types must be generated in order to create single-and dual-task conditions that are as equivalent (other than with respect to the dual-task requirement) as possible.
Experiments 1a and 1b
The main purpose of the present experiments was to attempt to replicate and generalize the results of Schumacher et al. (2001) using appropriate baselines and appropriate deadlines. Two concurrent training experiments were run, using the same subjects for both experiments. One of the experiments, Experiment 1a, replicated most of Experiment 1 from Schumacher et al., with the following differences. Presentation of the visual stimuli was modified slightly. This was done in order to make the stimulus presentation for Experiments 1a and 1b the same. In the present experiment, three gray disks were presented, one of which became brighter or dimmer briefly. As in Schumacher et al.'s Experiment 1, the task was to localize the changing disk. As well, blocks were organized differently. In the present experiment, subjects performed pure single-task blocks, pure dual-task blocks, and mixed single-task blocks. Finally, deadlines for each task and for each trial type were calculated from RT distributions from the last block of that block type. For example, the deadline for the visual-manual task in dual-task blocks was calculated from the RT distribution of visual-manual trials from the last-performed dual-task block.
The other experiment, Experiment 1b, aimed to generalize the Schumacher et al. (2001) result to a different combination of tasks. Experiment 1b was the same as Experiment 1a except that subjects were instructed to indicate whether the disk that changed became brighter or dimmer. Detecting the location of a target is intrinsically different from determining the identity of a target, and we wanted to investigate whether the Schumacher et al. result would generalize to different types of visual-manual tasks.
Experiment 1a (i.e., which disk changed) is referred to as the localization experiment, and Experiment 1b (i.e., brighter vs. dimmer) is referred to as the discrimination experiment. In both Experiment 1a and 1b, the five conditions outlined by Meyer and Kieras (1999) have been satisfied, so virtually perfect time-sharing would be expected if their theory is correct.
Another reason for using a different visual-manual task in the discrimination experiment was that it was expected to be more difficult than in the localization experiment. Specifically, we expected that the discrimination task would have a longer central stage of processing. It is possible that a latent capacity limitation was responsible for the observed lack of dual-task interference in Schumacher et al.'s (2001) Experiment 1. Therefore, increasing the duration of central processing in the (faster) visual-manual task makes it more likely that central processing of the two tasks will overlap in time and that dual-task interference will be observed.
Appropriate Baselines Revisited
To minimize the potential problems with the baselines used by Schumacher et al. (2001) , we set up our blocks in a different manner. Like Schumacher et al., we included homogeneous singletask blocks. We also included homogeneous dual-task blocks. We argue that by doing so, we eliminated trial type uncertainty, suboptimal preparation, and task-switching problems in dual-task blocks. This allowed subjects to be fully prepared before the trial because they knew exactly what events would occur on every trial (as in the pure single-task blocks). However, homogeneous singleand dual-task blocks still differed. On dual-task trials subjects had to be prepared to perform one task and the other task, whereas on homogeneous single-task trials subjects were required to be prepared to perform only one task. Although the results of DeJong's work (1995, Experiment 3) suggest that subjects do prepare to perform one task and then the other in dual-task trials, it is unclear whether the second to-be-performed task is as prepared as the first task. However, by using homogeneous dual-task blocks, subjects should be better prepared than the subjects in Schumacher et al. (2001) who performed mixed (single-and dual-task trials in the same block) blocks of trials. Furthermore, we expected that the effort mobilized by subjects in pure blocks (single-task and dualtask) would be very similar because deadlines were taken from the same points in their respective RT distributions, therefore making it equally difficult to beat the deadline across trial type. Thus, by using a more appropriate deadline we hoped to minimize differences in exerted effort (see the Mobilized Effort section above).
We also included heterogeneous single-task blocks. On these blocks, on each trial either the auditory-vocal or the visual-manual task was performed. Because subjects could not know which trial type would be performed from trial to trial, it is unlikely that subjects would be as prepared on these trials as on homogeneous single-task blocks, or on dual-task blocks, where they could prepare to process the tasks in a specific order. Unlike in the dual-task blocks, there was task uncertainty, which introduced the possibility that subjects would be prepared for, or expect, a stimulus that failed to occur. As well, differences in levels of effort may have existed between heterogeneous single-task blocks and dual-task blocks, although measures (calculating deadlines for each trial type from the RT distribution from the previous block of that trial type) were taken to minimize this effect (see the Mobilized Effort section above).
Although our design may still have minor problems in equating the various trial types (which seem unavoidable), we have eliminated some of the potential differences and minimized others. Separate deadlines for each trial type were used to equate better for potential differences in mobilized effort. By structuring the blocks so that both homogeneous single-task and dual-task blocks were "pure," we have reduced differences in preparatory state and costs associated with task switching. These issues still apply to heterogeneous single-task blocks, however. As a result, subjects will be least prepared on heterogeneous single-task trials, but the difference in preparatory state between homogeneous single-and dualtask trials will be greatly reduced. In all blocks, differences in levels of exerted effort may exist (subjects may inherently perceive dual-task blocks as more difficult and compensate by exerting more effort), although by calculating separate deadlines for each trial type we have minimized differences between blocks associated with the explicit deadlines imposed by the experimental procedure.
The goal of the present experiments was to measure dual-task interference. To do this, we compared performance from the two single-task conditions with performance from the dual-task condition. Therefore it is important to examine what other differences exist between the two single-task conditions and the dual-task condition.
Differences between homogeneous single-and dual-task conditions reflect any differences in preparation (which we would expect to be minimal given that task certainty exists in both conditions), any differences in available capacity caused by differences in exerted effort, and dual-task interference costs. Some of these effects could exaggerate dual-task interference, whereas others could mask it. Any preparation advantage in the single-task trials would tend to exaggerate dual-task interference, whereas increased effort exerted on dual-task trials would tend to mask dual-task interference.
We also included heterogeneous single-task trials as another comparison condition for dual-task performance. Differences between these conditions reflect differences in preparation (which would be larger than the preparation difference between homogeneous single-and dual-task conditions given the task uncertainty inherent to the heterogeneous single-task blocks), differences in exerted effort, and dual-task interference costs. Better preparation on dual-task trials and increases in exerted effort on dual-task trials would both tend to mask dual-task interference.
These issues make using heterogeneous single-task performance as the baseline for measuring dual-task interference questionable. In our opinion, homogeneous single-task performance provides the best baseline with which to compare dual-task performance. Any differences in preparation or exerted effort would be expected to be small and operating in opposite directions. On the other hand, preparatory difference between heterogeneous single-and dualtask performance may be relatively large because of the difference in task certainty and task-switching requirements between these two conditions. Given that the amount of dual-task interference may be small following extended practice, apparently minor differences between the two conditions may be sufficient to mask dual-task interference. As a result, our primary measure of dualtask interference is the difference between performance on dualtask blocks and homogeneous single-task blocks.
Method Subjects
Seven subjects (3 women and 4 men), ages 19 to 33 years, participated in this experiment in exchange for money (between $110 and $150 Canadian). The exact amount of money paid depended on earned bonuses based on performance and the number of sessions performed. One subject was a graduate student (Subject 2); the other 6 were undergraduates recruited from the research assistants in our laboratory (Subjects 1, 4, 5, and 6) or the general University of Waterloo (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada) population (Subjects 3 and 7). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. Only 1 subject (Subject 2) was aware of the hypothesis under investigation prior to completion of the experimental sessions. The performance of this subject was not qualitatively different from that of the other subjects, and thus awareness of the hypothesis did not influence the results of the experiments.
Stimuli
The stimuli were the same in both experiments. On trials in which the auditory-vocal task was performed, a low-, medium-, or high-pitched tone was presented for 40 ms. Tone frequencies were 220, 880, and 3520 Hz. At the start of every trial, three disks, each with a diameter of 2.0°of visual angle, were presented horizontally on the computer monitor. The space between the disks was 1.4°of visual angle; thus, the row of disks subtended 8.8°of visual angle. The row of disks was centered both horizontally and vertically on the monitor screen. The disks were presented in light gray on a blue background. The luminance 1 of the default disks was 35.4 cd/m 2 ; the luminance of the background was 3.1 cd/m 2 . On trials in which the visual-manual task was performed, one of the three disks changed in luminance for 100 ms, becoming either brighter or dimmer. When the disk became brighter, the luminance increased to 51.5 cd/m 2 for 100 ms, whereas when the disk became dimmer, the luminance decreased to 17.7 cd/m 2 for 100 ms. RGB (red, green, blue) coordinates were as follows: for the blue background, 0, 0, 42; for the light gray (default) disks, 40, 40, 40; for the dimmer disk, 30, 30, 30; and for the brighter disk, 47, 47, 47, on a 0 -63 scale.
Design
Each subject participated in both experiments (Experiment 1a and 1b) for a minimum of 12 sessions. Because of individual differences, some subjects took longer to reach asymptotic levels of performance than others, hence the differences in number of sessions performed by each subject. One subject performed additional sessions for exploratory purposes.
Experiment 1a was very similar to that performed by the subjects in Experiment 1 of Schumacher et al. (2001) . There were two tasks that subjects could perform. In the auditory-vocal task, subjects responded to the pitch of a low, medium, or high tone by saying "one," "two," or "three," respectively. In the visual-manual task, subjects indicated, with a manual 1 The monitor used in these experiments failed after all data had been collected, and previous luminance measures were not available. Prior to performing the experiments, the difference in luminance between the brighter and default disks and the difference in luminance between the dimmer and default disks were roughly equated. The luminance values reported are taken from the monitor that replaced the actual monitor used.
button press, which of three disks changed in intensity. In each of the 12 (or more) sessions, subjects performed four different block types two times each (for a total of eight blocks per session). Subjects always performed the blocks in the same order, and each block type was presented once in the first four blocks. The block order used in the first four blocks was repeated in the last four blocks. Block order was partially counterbalanced across subjects so that every four subjects formed a completely counterbalanced set (i.e., a Latin square).
In one of the block types, subjects performed 36 auditory-vocal trials. In a second block type, subjects performed 36 visual-manual trials. In the third block type, subjects performed 18 single-task trials of each trial type intermixed at random. Finally, in the fourth block type, subjects performed 36 trials in which both tasks were performed with stimuli presented simultaneously (0-ms SOA). Subjects were informed of the block type and the value of applicable deadlines (described below) prior to each block. After each block a summary screen was displayed that communicated the mean RT of correct trials and the percentage of correct responses for the tasks performed in that block. We refer to the block types in which a single task of the same type was performed as single-task blocks. Single-task blocks in which either task could be presented are referred to as OR blocks (because one or the other task was performed, but not both). Finally, blocks in which both tasks were performed on each trial are referred to as AND blocks (because the auditory-vocal and visual-manual tasks were both performed on each trial).
Experiment 1b was the same as Experiment 1a, except for the visualmanual task. The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1a, but now subjects had to indicate whether the changing disk became brighter or dimmer; the location of the changing disk now became irrelevant to the response. This particular visual-manual task proved to be more difficult than the visual-manual task used in Experiment 1a. During exploratory sessions with 1 of the subjects, the position of the changing disk was held constant (at the center disk location) in the hopes that it would make the task easier. This proved to be the case, although it remained more difficult than the visual-manual task used in Experiment 1a. For the subsequent 4 subjects, disk position was held constant at the center disk location. As previously mentioned, making the visual-manual task more difficult allowed us to explore the possibility that the lack of dual-task interference observed by Schumacher et al. (2001) in their Experiment 1 resulted from a failure of central processing overlap.
Subjects 1-5 performed one session of each experiment each time they came into the lab. The order of experiments was counterbalanced across subjects. Given that these subjects were performing both experiments concurrently, we were concerned that their results might be affected by the fact that the visual-manual task was changing back and forth from session to session. Given that the stimuli for the two versions of the visual-manual task were identical, it seemed reasonable that task confusions could be experienced by subjects and that this confusion might cause subjects to adopt what Meyer and Kieras (1997b) referred to as a cautious scheduling strategy. If so, it is possible that dual-task interference observed for these subjects could have arisen from this cautious strategy as opposed to structural dual-task interference. Although there were no indications that between-session interference was occurring, we explored this possibility by testing 2 additional naive subjects (Subjects 6 and 7) in Experiment 1a in its entirety before completing Experiment 1b. These subjects performed two sessions (of the same experiment) each time they came into the lab.
It is worth noting that in the Schumacher et al. (2001) experiment, subjects performed 3,444 trials, of which only 324 were dual-task trials (roughly 9.4%). In the present experiments subjects performed a minimum of 3,408 trials, of which 852 were dual-task trials (25%) in each experiment. Therefore, subjects in the present experiments had more than twice as much dual-task practice than the subjects in the Schumacher et al. experiment.
Procedure
Each subject came to the lab four or five times per week to perform one session of each experiment (or two sessions of the same experiment, for Subjects 6 and 7). The subject was seated in a dimly lit, black-walled room about 60 cm from a computer monitor. A scorer was seated to the right of the subject to code for accuracy of vocal responses. Each session took about 30 min, and a short (5-min) break was taken between sessions. The experiments were run on the same 486DX 33-MHz computer. Tones were presented over the computer's internal speaker. Manual responses were made on a standard North American QWERTY keyboard. A voice key stopped the clock to measure vocal RTs. The scorer pressed a key on the keypad located on the extreme right of the keyboard in response to a vocal response of "one," "two," or "three" by the subject. In Experiment 1a subjects responded to the location of the changing disk, ignoring whether the changing disk became brighter or dimmer. If the leftmost disk changed luminance, subjects pressed the Z key with their left ring finger. If the center disk changed luminance, subjects pressed the X key with their left middle finger. Finally, if the rightmost disk changed luminance, subjects pressed the C key with their left index finger. In Experiment 1b subjects responded to the change in luminance of the changing disk, ignoring the location of the change. If the changing disk became brighter, subjects responded by pressing the A key with their left middle finger. If the changing disk became dimmer, subjects responded by pressing the Z key with their index finger. StimulusϪresponse mappings for both visualmanual tasks were designed so that response mappings seemed natural. The brighter response was above the dimmer response, the left location was mapped to the leftmost finger, the middle location was mapped to the middle finger, and the rightmost location was mapped to the rightmost finger.
For both experiments and all block types, each trial began with the presentation of the row of three default disks. Five hundred milliseconds later the auditory stimulus, the visual stimulus, or both stimuli were presented. On trials in which only the auditory-vocal task was performed, a low-, medium-, or high-pitched tone sounded for 40 ms, and subjects responded by saying "one," "two," or "three" into a microphone connected to a voice key. Once the voice key was tripped, the disks disappeared and the scorer made a keypress corresponding to the subject's response. Once this keypress was made, a display containing two or three rows was displayed on the far left of the screen (centered vertically). The first row had the word VOCAL presented in white; the second row had the word speed followed by the subject's speed in milliseconds, displayed in white (e.g., speed: 345) . If an error occurred on the trial, the words voice ERROR! were displayed in red in the third row. If no error occurred, nothing was displayed in the third row.
On trials in which the visual-manual task was performed, one of the three disks changed in luminance, becoming either brighter or dimmer, for 100 ms, after which it returned to the default luminance. In Experiment 1a subjects indicated the location of the disk that changed. In Experiment 1b subjects indicated whether the change was an increase or a decrease in luminance. Once a response was made, the disks disappeared and a display containing two or three rows was displayed on the far right of the screen (centered vertically). The first row had the word KEYPRESS presented in white; the second row had the word speed followed by the subject's RT in milliseconds, displayed in white (e.g., speed: 412). If an error occurred on the trial, the words keypress ERROR ! were displayed in red in the third row. If no error occurred, nothing was displayed in the third row. This display remained on screen for 1,500 ms, at which point the screen went blank for 1,500 ms before the next trial began with the onset of the three default disks.
Deadlines and Incentives
To encourage virtually perfect time-sharing, we used incentives and deadlines. Unlike the deadlines used by Schumacher et al. (2001) , ours were calculated from the most recent block of the same trial type to equate better across trial types for the effort mobilized in each block of trials. Over the course of both experiments subjects earned points for which they were rewarded (with monetary bonuses) at the end of the experiments. For every 50,000 points collected, subjects received $1 Canadian. In total, subjects received between $14 and $20 in bonuses. Points were earned by recording an RT on a task that was lower than the predetermined deadline. Deadlines were determined at the beginning of each block and were calculated from the most recent block of the same type. So, if the present block was a dual-task block, deadlines for each task were calculated from the respective task from the immediately preceding dual-task block (which could be from a previous session). Deadlines were set to the 75th percentile of the RT distribution for the task. Subjects received 100 points each time their RT on the present trial was faster than the deadline. To encourage accurate performance, 100 points were deducted for an incorrect response, and no points were received even if the RT beat the deadline. The first time subjects performed a block type, deadlines for all tasks were arbitrarily set to 2,000 ms. These deadlines were applicable only during the first four blocks of the first session of each experiment. Deadlines were calculated within each experiment only. So, if the subject was performing in Experiment 1a in the present session, deadlines were calculated from the most recent block of each type from Experiment 1a.
Results
Because both experiments were performed with the same subjects, the data were analyzed together, and experiment (1a or 1b) was included as a within-subject factor. In the main analysis, only the last 12 sessions performed by each subject were included. Session (1-12) and response type (single, OR, AND) were also included as within-subject factors. Only trials in which all responses were correct were included in the RT analysis. Prior to performing the RT analysis an outlier analysis was performed. A modified version of the procedure described by Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994) was performed on all correct RTs to remove outliers in each condition for each subject. If a trial contained an outlier, the whole trial was excluded from further analysis. Less than 2.2% of the data were lost as outliers. Separate analyses were performed on the auditory-vocal and visual-manual tasks. Mean RTs by session and response type are displayed in Table 1 and Figure 1 . Results from the analysis including all 12 sessions are presented first, followed by a second analysis focusing on the last
RT to the Auditory-Vocal Task
As subjects became more practiced, their RTs decreased, F(11, 66) ϭ 17.6, MSE ϭ 14,709, p Ͻ .0001. Subjects again responded fastest on single-task trials (367 ms) followed by OR trials (433 ms), and finally by AND trials (481 ms), F(2, 12) ϭ 25.1, MSE ϭ 21,959, p Ͻ .0001. The effect of response type was larger in Experiment 1b (the discrimination visual-manual task) than for Experiment 1a (the localization visual-manual task), F(2, 12) ϭ 14.8, MSE ϭ 11,043, p Ͻ .001. The effect of response type also decreased with increasing practice, F(22, 132) ϭ 5.0, MSE ϭ 1,000, p Ͻ .0001. All of these effects and interactions are qualified by a significant three-way interaction between experiment, session, and response type, F(22, 132) ϭ 2.2, MSE ϭ 715, p Ͻ .01. In the localization experiment (Experiment 1a) after 12 sessions the effect of response type (AND minus single-task performance) was only 39 ms, and the difference between AND and OR performance was only 4 ms. However, for the discrimination experiment (Experiment 1b) after 12 sessions the effect of response type was 118 ms, and the difference between AND and OR performance was a much larger 68 ms.
Given that we are interested in the effects of dual-task performance after extensive practice, we now turn to an analysis of the last four sessions of the experiments. As can be seen in Figure 1 , performance was relatively constant during these sessions, having approached asymptotic values.
RT to the Visual-Manual Task for the Last Four Sessions
Subjects responded faster in the localization experiment (293 ms) than in the discrimination experiment (361 ms), F(1, 6) ϭ 113.0, MSE ϭ 1,727, p Ͻ .0001. Subjects were fastest on singletask trials (311 ms), followed by OR trials (326 ms), and finally by AND trials (344 ms), F(2, 12) ϭ 6.5, MSE ϭ 2,383, p Ͻ .02. The effect of response type was smaller in the localization experiment (13 ms) than in the discrimination experiment (53 ms), F(2, 12) ϭ 4.9, MSE ϭ 1,105, p Ͻ .03. No other effects approached significance (all Fs Ͻ 1.2).
RT to the Auditory-Vocal Task for the Last Four Sessions
Subjects were fastest on single-task trials (315 ms), followed by OR trials (360 ms), and finally by AND trials (398 ms), F(2, 12) ϭ 12.7, MSE ϭ 7,617, p Ͻ .002. However, in the localization experiment, the effect of response type was 44 ms, whereas it was 122 ms in the discrimination experiment, and this difference was significant, F(2, 12) ϭ 10.6, MSE ϭ 2,491, p Ͻ .003. No other effects were significant (Fs Ͻ 1.2, ps Ͼ .16).
Follow-up analyses were performed for each experiment (localization, discrimination) for each task (auditory-vocal, visualmanual) using response type and session (the last four blocks) as within-subject factors. The purpose of these analyses was to determine whether there was a significant effect of response type after extensive practice. 
Experiment 1a (Localization) for the Visual-Manual Task
Subjects were fastest on single-task trials (287 ms), followed by OR trials (292 ms), and finally AND trials (300 ms), although this main effect failed to reach significance, F(2, 12) ϭ 3.0, MSE ϭ 423, p Ͻ .09. No other effects were significant (F Ͻ 1).
Experiment 1b (Discrimination) for the Visual-Manual Task
Subjects were fastest on single-task trials (336 ms), followed by OR trials (359 ms), and finally AND trials (389 ms), F(2, 12) ϭ 6.4, MSE ϭ 3,065, p Ͻ .02. No other effects approached significance (Fs Ͻ 1).
Experiment 1a (Localization) for the Auditory-Vocal Task
Subjects were fastest on single-task trials (317 ms) compared with either OR (358 ms) or AND (361 ms) trials, F(2, 12) ϭ 13.3, MSE ϭ 1,266, p Ͻ .001. No other effects were significant (Fs Ͻ 1.8, ps Ͼ .20).
Experiment 1b (Discrimination) for the Auditory-Vocal Task
Subjects were fastest on single-task trials (314 ms), followed by OR trials (362 ms), and finally AND trials (436 ms), F(2, 12) ϭ 12.0, MSE ϭ 8,842, p Ͻ .002. No other effects approached significance (Fs Ͻ 1.1, ps Ͼ .38).
Testing for Virtually Perfect Time-Sharing in Each Subject
We also examined performance for each subject individually. We looked for differences between AND and OR performance and differences between AND and single-task performance for each subject in each task (visual-manual, auditory-vocal) in each experiment, after extensive practice. Analyses are confined to the final two sessions performed by each subject. For the purposes of these analyses, individual trials have been treated as independent observations and independent t tests were performed between AND and OR performance and AND and single-task performance, for each subject individually. The purpose of these analyses was to determine whether any individual subject achieved virtually perfect time-sharing. Given that four t tests were performed for each subject in each experiment, the critical p required to achieve significance was adjusted to 0.0125 (.05/4). Table 2 shows p values for these analyses, and Table 3 shows mean RTs for each condition being compared. Table 2 indicates that for every subject except Subject 5, at least one AND versus OR comparison in Experiment 1b (discrimination) achieved significance. Therefore even with the most liberal baseline for virtually perfect time-sharing, these subjects showed dual-task interference in Experiment 1b. In Experiment 1a (localization) all subjects showed differences between AND performance and single-task performance for at least one of the tasks. Although this is a more stringent test of virtually perfect timesharing, this result indicates dual-task interference and fails to replicate the Schumacher et al. (2001) result. As argued in the introduction, AND versus single-task performance is the most appropriate baseline from which to measure dual-task interference. Therefore, this more stringent test is also the most appropriate test.
It is important to note that the dual-task interference observed in the present experiments is not a result of interleaving sessions of Experiments 1a and 1b. Significant interference was observed for both Subjects 6 and 7, who performed Experiment 1a to completion before beginning Experiment 1b. Given the similarity between the results for subjects who performed the experiments interleaved and those who did not, there is no support for the hypothesis that interleaving the two experiments prevented subjects from achieving optimal performance, particularly in the dual-task trial blocks.
Subject 5 is the only subject who appears to have come close to demonstrating virtually perfect time-sharing. AND performance was generally faster than OR performance in all conditions. So, using the most liberal measure of dual-task interference, this subject shows no interference. However, the difference between AND performance and single-task performance for the auditoryvocal task in the localization experiment (16 ms) was statistically significant, and it approached significance in the discrimination experiment (13 ms). Therefore, Subject 5 was not able to achieve virtually perfect time-sharing in the localization experiment. As well, in the discrimination experiment, performance on the visualmanual task was 16 ms faster for the single-task condition than for the AND condition, although this difference was not significant either. Adding up the differences between AND and single-task performance for the discrimination experiment for Subject 5 shows that the difference was rather large (29 ms). This pattern of results suggests that even Subject 5 failed to achieve virtually perfect time-sharing in either experiment.
Accuracy for the Visual-Manual Task
Mean proportion correct for both tasks in each condition can be found in Table 4 . The main effect of experiment was significant, F(1, 6) ϭ 77.8, MSE ϭ .0203, p Ͻ .0001. Subjects were more accurate on the localization visual-manual task (.958 mean proportion correct) than on the discrimination visual-manual task (.846 mean proportion correct). The interaction between experiment and response type was also significant, F(2, 12) ϭ 16.7, MSE ϭ .0127, p Ͻ .01. In the localization experiment subjects were most accurate in the AND condition (.970 mean proportion correct), followed by the OR condition (.958 mean proportion correct), and finally by the single-task condition (.946 mean proportion correct). In the discrimination experiment the differences between response type conditions were larger and had a different pattern. Subjects were most accurate for single-task trials (.898 mean proportion correct), followed by AND trials (.845 mean proportion correct), and finally by OR trials (.796 mean proportion correct). The only other significant effect was the main effect of response type, F(2, 12) ϭ 7.0, MSE ϭ .0127, p Ͼ .01. No other effects approached significance (Fs Ͻ 1.3, ps Ͼ .26). 
Accuracy for the Auditory-Vocal Task
The only significant effect was an interaction between session and response type, F(22, 132) ϭ 2.1, MSE ϭ .0008, p Ͻ .01. Performance on AND trials was generally worse than performance on OR or single-task trials, but this effect was larger early in practice. The main effect of response type just failed to reach significance, F(2, 12) ϭ 3.5, MSE ϭ .0075, p Ͻ .07. Subjects were least accurate on AND trials (.930 mean proportion correct), followed by single-task trials (.950 mean proportion correct), and OR trials (.952 mean proportion correct). Finally, the three-way interaction between experiment, session, and response type also approached but failed to reach significance, F(22, 132) ϭ 1.5, MSE ϭ .0008, p Ͻ .09. OR performance was generally superior to single-task performance in the discrimination experiment (Experiment 1b) but not in the localization experiment (Experiment 1a). No other effects approached significance (all Fs Ͻ 1.4, all ps Ͼ .22).
It is worth noting that for the localization experiment (Experiment 1a) the mean accuracy for the visual-manual task was slightly (a .024 proportion correct difference) but significantly higher on AND trials than on single-task trials. This effect was accompanied by slower performance in the AND condition than in the single-task condition (average of 13 ms over the last four sessions) and likely represents a speed-accuracy trade-off within this task. No such speed-accuracy trade-off was observed in the auditory-vocal task performance. Subjects were on average 44 ms slower and .018 proportion correct less accurate over the last four sessions in the AND condition than in the single-task condition. We acknowledge that within a limited capacity framework it is possible for performance trade-offs to occur between tasks. However, the small accuracy advantage for the AND condition in the visual-manual task is not likely to account for the relatively large advantage in the single-task condition observed across the two tasks (in total 57 ms). Importantly, if the observers had achieved perfect time-sharing, then neither task would require central resources that require sharing. Both tasks would operate in parallel and would not trade off against one another. Consequently, it is not clear why or how processes in one task could trade off against ones in another task, assuming that observers had achieved perfect time-sharing. If the tasks did trade off in this complex way, then that form of trade-off would, in itself, provide evidence against perfect time-sharing.
Examining the Effects of Choice of Deadline
In the introduction to this article we raised the possibility of several confounds that may have hidden real dual-task interference in previous investigations of virtually perfect time-sharing. Specifically, we argued that homogeneous single-task performance in the experiments of Schumacher et al. (2001) was suboptimal because of the use of a heterogeneous single-task deadline. We argued that this suboptimal performance hid a real performance advantage for homogeneous single-task performance over heterogeneous single-task performance caused by trial type uncertainty and the omission of an expected stimulus on heterogeneous singletask trials. The results of Hazeltine et al.'s (2002) Experiments 2-4 indicate that when a more appropriate deadline is used, differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous single-task performance are revealed. The results of Experiments 1a and 1b herein confirm this finding (performance in OR blocks was consistently slower than single-task performance). These results (Hazeltine et al., 2002 , and the present experiments) demonstrate that the choice of deadline has a direct impact on the observed results. When deadlines are established from heterogeneous performance for all trial types, no difference is found between conditions after extensive practice (Schumacher et al., 2001) . Conversely, when deadlines for each trial type are established from performance in that trial type, differences between trial types are revealed (the present experiments).
Examining the Effects of Task Switching
We also raised the possibility that task-switch costs may have inflated RTs on mixed-block trials in the experiments of both Schumacher et al. (2001) and Hazeltine et al. (2002) . It is possible to examine this issue empirically by examining performance from the OR blocks and comparing trials where the to-be-performed task changed from the previous trial with trials where the to-beperformed task was the same as the previous task. To do so, we classified each OR trial as a task repetition or task switch based on the previous task performed (regardless of the accuracy of the previous trial). The first trial of each OR block was excluded from the analyses, as were incorrect trials. Separate analyses were performed on auditory-vocal and visual-manual trials. For each analysis, experiment (localization, detection), session (1-12), and task switch (task switch, task repetition) were entered as withinsubject factors. RTs in each analysis were screened for outliers as in earlier analyses. For the visual-manual and auditory-vocal tasks, respectively, less than 1.3% and 2.1% of trials were excluded as outliers. Results are displayed in Table 5 .
Task-switch analysis for the visual-manual task. As expected on the basis of earlier analyses, subjects responded faster in the localization experiment (Experiment 1a) than in the discrimination experiment (Experiment 1b), F(1, 6) ϭ 85.6, MSE ϭ 5,585, p Ͻ .0001. Subjects also responded faster with increasing amounts of practice, F(11, 66) ϭ 13.2, MSE ϭ 1,803, p Ͻ .0001. Although statistically not significant, subjects were marginally faster on task repetitions than on task switches (11 ms), F(1, 6) ϭ 4.6, MSE ϭ 2,447, p Ͻ .08. Session entered into interactions with experiment and task switch that just failed to reach significance, F(11, 66) ϭ 1.9, MSE ϭ 389, p Ͻ .06, and F(11, 66) ϭ 1.9, MSE ϭ 933, p Ͻ .07, respectively. Early in practice, subjects were faster on task repetitions than task switches (e.g., 21 ms in Session 1), but this advantage disappeared with practice (Ϫ2 ms in Session 12). With practice the advantage for the localization experiment decreased from 106 ms to 69 ms.
Task-switch analysis for the auditory-vocal task. As for the visual-manual task, subjects responded faster to the auditoryvocal task with practice, F(11, 66) ϭ 17.3, MSE ϭ 10,566, p Ͻ .0001. Subjects were 33 ms faster on task repetitions than on task switches, F(1, 6) ϭ 17.0, MSE ϭ 5,452, p Ͻ .007. With practice the advantage for task repetitions decreased from 74 ms in Session 1 to 14 ms in Session 12. This decrease was reflected in the interaction of session and task switch, F(11, 66) ϭ 3.1, MSE ϭ 959, p Ͻ .002. A separate analysis was performed for the auditoryvocal task that examined task-switch costs after extensive practice. This analysis was restricted to the last four sessions, and session, experiment, and task switch were entered into the analysis as within-subject factors. The only effect that approached significance was the main effect of task switch, F(1, 6) ϭ 4.8, MSE ϭ 1,761, p Ͻ .08. Subjects were marginally faster on task repetitions (350 ms) than on task switches (367 ms).
The results of the task-switch analysis suggest that early in practice, task-switching affected both the visual-manual and the auditory-vocal tasks. However, with increasing experience with the tasks, subjects appear to have developed a bias toward the visual-manual task that protected it from task-switching costs. On the other hand, task-switch costs remain for the auditory-vocal task, indicating that even after extensive practice, task-switching costs remain.
Discussion
The main purpose of the present experiments was to attempt to replicate and generalize the results of Schumacher et al. (2001) using appropriate baselines and appropriate deadlines. We made procedural changes to minimize potentially artifactual differences between conditions. Specifically, we used homogeneous dual-task blocks to make dual-task performance conditions more similar to homogeneous single-task blocks. As well, deadlines for each block type were calculated from the RT distributions from the most recent block of that type. This was done to encourage subjects to exert maximal effort in all block types. Experiment 1a aimed to replicate the results of Schumacher et al. using these more appropriate baselines and deadlines, whereas Experiment 1b aimed to generalize this result to a different combination of tasks. Specifically we wanted to know whether changing the localization visualmanual task to a discrimination visual-manual task would have any effect. According to Meyer and Kieras (1999) , virtually perfect time-sharing should be observed in both conditions.
Virtually perfect time-sharing did not occur. In our replication experiment (Experiment 1a) AND and OR performance converged, as in Schumacher et al. (2001) and Hazeltine et al. (2002) , but single-task performance remained superior to dual-task performance. One reason why single-and dual-task performance failed to converge may be that the deadlines used in the present study encouraged subjects to put maximal effort into all blocks. Subjects in the Schumacher et al. experiment may have placed less effort into homogeneous single-task blocks because of the benefits inherent to this trial type and the use of the heterogeneous single-task deadline. As a result, residual dual-task interference may have been masked by differences in effort. However, subjects in the present experiment were encouraged to exert as much effort in the homogeneous single-task blocks as in the dual-task blocks by the use of a more appropriate deadline (based on homogeneous singletask performance). Thus, effort was (better) equated for and the previously obscured dual-task interference was revealed. This result suggests that the absence of differences observed in the Schumacher et al. experiment was produced by differences in mobilized effort, rather than virtually perfect time-sharing.
In Experiment 1b, not only was there a substantial difference between AND and single-task performance after extensive practice, there was also a substantial difference between AND and OR performance. Even using a liberal baseline (OR performance), dual-task interference was observed in this experiment. In fact, substantially more dual-task interference was observed in Experiment 1b than in Experiment 1a.
This increase in dual-task interference may have resulted from the fact that the auditory-vocal task and the visual-manual task in Experiment 1b were both discrimination tasks; whereas in Experiment 1a, the visual-manual task was a localization task. Perhaps more similar tasks (e.g., two discrimination tasks) draw on more common limited resources than less similar tasks. This line of thought suggests the existence of multiple limited resources, as proposed by Navon and Gopher (1979) . It would be interesting to see what would happen if a localization auditory-vocal task were paired with a discrimination visual-manual task in one condition and a localization visual-manual task in another. If less interference were observed in the localization-discrimination condition than in the localization-localization condition, this would support the notion of multiple limited resources. Regardless, the presence of dual-task interference between a discrimination and a localization task also indicates that the tasks require common limited resources.
Another possible explanation for why less dual-task interference was observed in Experiment 1a than in Experiment 1b is that the visual-manual discrimination task required more central resources than the visual-manual localization task, resulting in more central processing overlap (and therefore more interference) in Experiment 1b. This explanation does not require the existence of mul- Note. V-M ϭ visual-manual; A-V ϭ auditory-vocal.
tiple limited resources and is therefore more parsimonious. We are presently exploring this question.
Results from the present study also help to reconcile the contradictory conclusions of Van Selst et al. (1999) and Schumacher et al. (2001) . Van Selst et al. reported that dual-task interference persists after extensive practice with a PRP paradigm, even for task combinations that avoid peripheral bottlenecks (one task was auditory-vocal, the other visual-manual). After extensive practice a 40-ms PRP effect was observed. Schumacher et al. reported that after sufficient practice it was possible to achieve virtually perfect time-sharing. Our research suggests that dual-task interference in the Schumacher et al. study was masked by differences in mobilized effort between conditions. The results of the present study indicate that when more appropriate deadlines and baselines are used, dual-task interference is revealed. Interestingly, the amount of interference observed in Experiment 1a is in line with the interference reported by Van Selst et al.
After testing the first 5 subjects in this study, we became concerned about the possibility that the reason we were not observing virtually perfect time-sharing in either experiment was that subjects were experiencing between-experiment interference as a result of interleaving the sessions of the two experiments that used visual-manual tasks that employed the same stimuli. To address this possibility, we had 2 additional subjects (Subjects 6 and 7) perform Experiment 1a to completion before embarking on Experiment 1b. Given that the pattern of results observed for these 2 subjects was qualitatively the same as that found for the first 5 subjects (both Subjects 6 and 7 showed significant dual-task interference in both Experiments 1a and 1b), their results show that between-experiment interference was not responsible for the dualtask interference observed in the present study.
For one subject (Subject 5) levels of dual-task interference failed to reach statistical significance in the discrimination experiment (although statistically significant differences were observed in the localization experiment); the difference between single-and dual-task performance was not zero (29 ms), however. One possible explanation for why dual-task interference was not observed is that central operations in the two tasks failed to overlap on a portion of trials. As a result a latent capacity limitation was encountered on these trials (see Ruthruff et al., 2003 , for a treatment of latent bottlenecks). Because RTs would be faster when the capacity limitation was latent than when it was active, the error variance after averaging these trials would be larger. This would affect our ability to detect small differences such as those observed in this experiment (29 ms). In support of the latent capacity limitation hypothesis is the fact that dual-task interference increased when a more difficult visual-manual task was used. In fact, the latent bottleneck hypothesis may be sufficient to explain the individual difference in the magnitude of the dual-task interference observed in these experiments: The larger the proportion of trials on which a latent bottleneck occurred, the smaller the predicted observed dual-task interference. This hypothesis also predicts that the observed dual-task interference should be larger when the faster task (the one that gains access to central processing first) is more centrally demanding. In line with this prediction, for all subjects, more dual-task interference was observed in Experiment 1b than in Experiment 1a.
Conclusions
In this article, we used dual-task paradigms to study the extent to which it may, or may not, be possible for well-practiced subjects to perform two basic choice-reaction tasks concurrently without dual-task interference. We presented a detailed reanalysis of several crucial methodological and theoretical issues involved in the design of dual-task paradigms purporting to demonstrate virtually perfect time-sharing during the performance of basic cognitive tasks. Using improved methods, with well-practiced and wellmotivated observers who were naive to the experimental hypotheses, we found consistent and persistent dual-task interference in two experiments that were slight modifications of the paradigm claimed by Schumacher et al. (2001) to demonstrate virtually perfect time-sharing. Our results challenge previous claims for virtually perfect time-sharing and instead suggest that there is, at present, virtually no evidence for virtually perfect time-sharing.
